Increasing the diplomatic costs of Russian cyber aggression, shoring up cyber defenses, or even fostering military-to-military or working-level diplomatic channels to discuss cyber red lines, however discretely and unofficially, could present better choices than apparently gambling with the safety of civilians that both sides' forces are sworn to protect. Putting aside that the Russian operation was cyber espionagestealing data rather than denying, disrupting, degrading, or destroying systemssome of these arguments reflected an idea that the United States should defend forward or persistently engage everywhere, all the time. Subscribe to the weekly Policy Currents newsletter to receive updates on the issues that matter most. A dual identity (military and law enforcement) and alignment under the Department of Homeland Security allow a separate cyber service to protect our nations global infrastructure from state actors who will be indistinguishable from criminal threats. From a defensive cyberspace perspective, the threat to the Department of Defense (DOD) has never been greater. - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, News Information sharing about threats, absent a strong model for interagency collaboration and a specific desired end state, is not enough. Army Services/Handout via REUTERS, Year in Review 2019: The U.S.-China Tech Cold War Deepens and Expands. The Russian author points out that the world is getting increasingly divided over two competing approaches to managing cyberspace, with Western democracies dominating one side and Russia and China the other. Sharing information with other federal agencies, our own agencies, and foreign partners and allies who have advanced cyber capabilities. Navy Step-by-step explanation. Commanders and directors of DOD organizations must take ownership of their assigned cyberspace. The CCMD-constructed networks are the only portion of the DODIN that the CCMD is directly responsible for. They use information operations, troop movements, proxy fighters, propaganda, diplomacy, economic pressures, and threats to coerce countries.Jim Garamone[2]. Training and Education Command(TECOM) All DOD organizations share cyberspace information and intelligence securely, and cyberspace is fully incorporated into joint force planning and operations. February 13, 2023 Air Land Sea Application Center, We have no room for complacency and history makes it clear that America has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield.Secretary James N. [1] Secretary Mattis Remarks on U.S. National Defense Strategy, January 19, 2018, C-SPAN, video, 49:06, https://www.c-span.org/video/?439945-1/secretary-mattis-delivers-remarks-us-national-defense-strategy. Russia is conducting cyber espionage that has the potential to disrupt critical infrastructure and erode confidence in America's democratic system, she said. 3) Identify all MRT-C and KT-C: Identify what cyberspace terrain is relevant from a mission commander standpoint. This graphic describes the four pillars of the U.S. National Cyber Strategy. Western analysts, fixated on untangling the now-defunct concept of the Gerasimov Doctrine, devoted far less attention to the Russian military's actual cyber experts, who starting in 2008 wrote a series of articles about the consequences of Washington's perceived militarization of cyberspace, including a mid-2016 finale that discussed Russia's need to pursue cyber peace with the United States by demonstrating an equal information potential.. This statement could be a result of the DoD's limited . NDIA is not responsible for screening, policing, editing, or monitoring your or another user's postings and encourages all of its users to use reasonable discretion and caution in evaluating or reviewing any posting. Privacy Program, Army Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. Adversaries China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are increasingly taking malicious cyber activities in the gray zone, which is below the threshold of armed conflict, to undermine U.S. and allies'security, she said. Justin Sherman (@jshermcyber) is a fellow at the Atlantic Councils Cyber Statecraft Initiative. Actions in cyberspace, particularly defensive actions within DOD cyberspace, should not be viewed as a traditional force-on-force competition. Full event video and after-event thoughts from the panelists. Agency Affected Recommendation Status; Department of Defense : The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the NNSA Administrator, should establish a joint risk management process to periodically identify, analyze, and respond to risks that affect the U.S. nuclear enterprise (including the nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery platforms, and nuclear command and control) and report, internally . Virtually all countries have access to some renewable energy resources (especially solar and wind power) and could thus substitute foreign supply with local resources. Unlike the air domain, the space domain is expanding as a realm of competition nearly simultaneously with another domain: cyberspace. An example would be an attack on critical infrastructure such as the power grid. There are other efforts to modernize cybersecurity within the DOD (and the federal government as a whole) that are relevant to CCMDs and all DOD organizations. Cyber confrontation between the United States and Russia is increasingly turning to critical civilian infrastructure, particularly power grids, judging from recent press reports. with Jeremi Suri The DOD released its own strategy outlining five lines of effort that help to execute the national strategy. The New York Cyber Task Forces 2017 report discusses the idea of leverage, for instance, in a somewhat productized sense vis--vis software and internet security. Open Government A new service emerges to ensure that warfighting in the domain receives the necessary focus for education, training, recruiting, doctrine development, force generation, and as a leading voice in the ongoing discussion of that domain at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Russian government tries to maintain greater control over domestic cyberspace than does the U.S., primarily to ensure political stability. limiting the collective reach of U.S. cyber operations at any given time; it also ignores the concept of points of leverage in the broader internet ecosystem. Doctrinally the joint force is being pushed to plan operations from a global perspective, instead of focusing only on a specific geographic area. This article establishes a clear, shared understanding of DOD cyberspace, provides guidance to the DOD to protect its cyberspace, and illustrates current and future efforts to improve DODs cybersecurity. It offers a separate voice within the military for the use of airpower on the strategic stage. This raises the distinction between chokepoints and leverage, however, where leverage provides highly scalable effects on cybersecurity (i.e., small inputs yielding outsized change across a system or ecosystem) and imposes significant costs for comparatively small input. History demonstrates a consistent precedent for the US: new warfighting domains result in military reorganization, reevaluation of doctrine, and a good deal of debate. Research, ideas, and leadership for a more secure, peaceful world. The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? Renewing America, Backgrounder The Russian author does not speculate on national interests per se but does describe major cyber-related disagreements between Russia and the U.S. in at least three major areas: the role of government in overseeing cyberspace; the militarization of cyberspace and the related applicability of existing international law; and the idea of legally binding treaties versus non-binding guidelines for how information and communication technologies should be used. Accurate reporting of the cybersecurity status of DOD cyberspace is critical. feeling rejected by wife during pregnancy . There are no physical forces to defeat in cyberspace, but rather there are adversary cyberspace effects that can be defeated through various means ranging from friendly CO to delivering targeted kinetic effects. Figure1: Cyberspace Operations Missions, Actions, and Forces. Additionally, the 2019 Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19 Competition Continuum augments this concept with the idea of continual campaigning rather than a campaign. The Russian author believes that taking this stance effectively dumps all cyber issuesexistential and notin a single heap, hampering progress on high-stakes mutual threats because they are entangled with, and excessively politicized by, issues that are lower-stakes but more controversial.). The NNSA, according to Gordon-Hargerty, has three main objectives, to maintain the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. We will give a quick summary of these organizations as this will help you understand when we address the complications and solutions for CCMDs. Both, for instance, view the other as a highly capable adversary. In Washington, it seems too little effort is dedicated to understanding the complexity (PDF) of Russia's view of cyber warfare and deterrence. 4. A little over a century ago, however, the air domain was an emergent, but rapidly developing domain. For their part, the Russians made a different historical comparison to their 2016 activity. JFHQ-DODIN leads unified actions across all DOD for DODIN operations and defeats, denies, and disrupts cyberattacks against the DODIN. Andrey Krutskikh, the Kremlin's bombastic point man on cyber-diplomacy issues, likened Russia's development of cyber capabilities that year to the Soviet Union's first successful atomic bomb test in 1949. Kyle Hanslovan, a cyber-warfare specialist serving with the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group of the Maryland Air National Guard, works at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Md., Oct. 30, 2017. (Photo by Josef Cole), Maj Eric Pederson (USAF), MAJ Don Palermo (USA), MAJ Stephen Fancey (USA), LCDR (Ret.) Upholding cyberspace behavioral norms during peacetime. Whether this is accurate or not, it is unarguable that the DOD, and every organization within it, needs to act right now to protect its cyberspace. Focusing entirely on CO, and acknowledging that cyberspace effects can be delivered instantly from one side of the planet to the other, the DOD must work to ensure administrative processes do not hinder friendly defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) and that DOD cybersecurity is prioritized as part of the on-going global effort for us to act at the speed of relevance. Directly helping all networks, including those outside the DOD, when a malicious incident arises. Troops have to increasingly worry about cyberattacks while still achieving their missions, so the DOD needs to make processes more flexible. The U.S. and Russia should strive toward a much better understanding of one anothers red lines (i.e., what actions would trigger retaliation, especially kinetic retaliation) and cyber-mission priorities, intents, capabilities and organization. Updating contract language with DOD partners in a timely manner to address current cybersecurity issues such as enabling cybersecurity-related information sharing across the DOD and limiting/governing cleared defense contractors (CDC) remote access into the DODIN. The notion that Russia's 2016 effort to affect the U.S. presidential election was a Cyber or Political Pearl Harbor is an appropriate comparison only in the sense that U.S. officials were blindsided by Moscow's distinct approach to cyber warfare: an almost seamless blend of psychological and technical operations that differs from most Western concepts. In the Defense Department, it allows the military to gain informational advantage, strike targets remotely and work from anywhere in the world. More than 5.3 million others are still estimated to be . Appendix 2 69, Analysis & Opinions This will result in increased cyberspace command and control and decrease DOD security incident response times. About ALSSA But leverage is also a more widely useful concept for the internet and cybersecurity, and that notion should play a bigger part in discussions around U.S. cyber strategy. Figure 2: The 44 DOD Components of the DODIN. China is using cyber espionage for military and economic advantages, Mortelmans said. The Russians and Chinese are playing a long game to threaten the international, rules-based orderand they are doing this with actions below the threshold of armed conflict. The U.S. authors believe that key concerns for the U.S. government in the cyber domain include stopping foreign interference and disinformation intended to undermine American democracy, protecting critical infrastructure, preventing or guarding against reckless malware and safeguarding confidential communications, and that some of the related threats emanate directly from Russia. One of Moscows chief interests, in the U.S. authors view, is weaponizing cyber capabilities to sow discord and embarrass Western powers it views as undermining its sovereignty (principally the United States).. Is Chinas Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security? - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Analysis & Opinions - Slate, Analysis & Opinions [8] Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nations Cybersecurity, Federal Register, Volume 86, No. The Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff has primacy in external cyberspace operations, to include espionage, information warfare, and offensive cyberspace operations. tel: (703) 522-1820. Washington could follow Moscow's lead in realizing that this is a long-term struggle that requires innovative and thoughtful solutions as opposed to reflexive ones. In the case of . Hearing some of these calls, we at Russia Matters and the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism were moved to probe them further: Is a cyber rules-of-the-road agreement feasible? & Opinions this will help you understand when we address the complications and solutions for CCMDs who... Components of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil Suri DOD. ) has never been greater Deepens and Expands, including those outside the DOD to... 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